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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of the financialisation of the British welfare state. In a 
continuation of neo-liberal privatisation and labour market activation, the financialised 
welfare state pursues a policy of welfare retrenchment, while engaging in forms of social 
engineering aimed at producing self-responsibilised individuals and communities who are 
financially literate, ‘investment-ready’ and economically productive. New financial 
instruments such as social impact bonds are deployed to these ends, both to ‘solve social 
problems’ and enable cost saving. Through the use of such financial instruments, the 
implementation of regulatory infrastructures and tax incentives, the financialised welfare state 
becomes a vehicle for the transfer of wealth from the public to private investors, while 
subjecting the domain of social policy to the vicissitudes of global financial markets. This 
paper offers a critique of these developments, situating the case of Britain within the broader 
global context and with regard to the implications for understanding the current political 
economy of the welfare state. 
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The global financial crisis of 2008 unleashed a wave of critical sentiment against the 
financial sector that was seen to have caused financial meltdown due to excessive 
self-interest or even reckless and unethical practices. One response has been to call 
for better governmental regulation of the sector. Another response has been to suggest 
that finance could be put to good use and serve a social purpose, and that one route 
out of crisis may well be to ‘do well’ by ‘doing good’, according to advocates of what 
is known as venture philanthropy or ‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Green and Bishop, 
2011).1 A new generation of ‘millennials’ are said to embrace this spirit of ethical 
entrepreneurism, wanting their business models to reflect their civic-mindedness 
(Tanenhaus, 2014). Social investment (or impact investing as it is also known) is a 
core aspect of this ‘social turn’ for finance and involves the financing of projects and 
enterprises that have an explicit social or environmental purpose. 
 
In recent years, finance’s social turn has also become relevant for public policy and 
the welfare state. Britain is one of the pioneers of  the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB), 
which has been taken up as a mechanism through which to attract private finance for 
social interventions commissioned by the state, examples of which are the 
improvement the employability skills of young people ‘not-in-education-employment-
or-training’ (‘NEETs’) or the reduction of recidivism. Governments pay investors a 
return on their investments if and when interventions achieve their aims. Overall, the 
aim is to ‘solve social problems’ such as unemployment, crime, ill-health or welfare 
dependency, while at the same time providing cost-savings to the welfare state. 
 
Situating the case of Britain within the broader context of a growing global social 
investment market, the paper provides an analysis of what is identified as the 
financialisation of the welfare state. Recent research in critical IPE has demonstrated 
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the state’s active role in the financialisation of the economy (cf. Davis and Walsh, 
2015),2 has drawn attention to the transformation of the state itself (cf. Lagna, 2016)3, 
and the role that finance plays in shaping the marketisation of welfare in different 
sectors of the welfare state, e.g. with regard to pensions, housing, education or 
healthcare (Pollock, 2004; Blackburn, 2006; Aalbers, 2008; Engelen et al., 2014). The 
financialisation of different aspects of welfare presents a complex and variegated 
picture. This paper seeks to contribute to understanding this picture by providing an 
analysis of the introduction of ‘social impact bonds’ (SIBs) into social policy in the 
UK as part of a current social turn of finance.  
 
The paper argues that the defining characteristic of the financialisation of the welfare 
state is in effect a co-imbrication between the state and finance: on the one hand, the 
state accesses finance to achieve social policy goals, on the other hand, finance uses 
the state to accumulate financial profits. The social policy goals are underpinned by a 
neoliberal agenda that combines fiscal consolidation and austerity with efforts to curb 
welfare dependency and promote labour market activation policies. In addition, there 
is a new orientation on promoting financial literacy programmes that help people to 
become better able to function as ‘responsible’ borrowers in an increasingly 
financialised economy. The financialisation of the welfare state is characterised by the 
the introduction of a financial calculus into policy-making and an increased exposure 
to financial market logics that lead to a new form of privatisation marked by the 
transfer of public assets to private investors as interest payments on the money lent to 
governments to fund these social policy initiatives. While Britain is playing a leading 
role in growing the nascent social investment market, this is a global phenomenon 
that is supported and promoted at the supranational level.  
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This paper thus begins with a discussion of the promotion of impact investing by the 
G8 Social Investment Taskforce in response to the global financial crisis.  The paper 
provides a brief overview of the global social investment market and then turns its 
attention to the UK and the use of ‘social impact bonds’ (SIBs) for a variety of 
different social interventions since 2010. The paper explains what SIBs are and how 
they work, providing a critique in particular of the way that they are used not simply 
to fund services, but to restructure the welfare state. The paper takes issue with the 
cost-saving agenda that is attached to the initiatives that are being funded and 
discusses the ways in which they have been tethered to an austerity agenda in 
regressive ways in order to argue that the creation of a new financial market for social 
investment constitutes part of the attempt to find new drivers of economic growth that 
are premised on processes of what David Harvey (2004) has termed ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. While the paper focuses on SIBs and social policy in particular, the 
paper also points to the rise of an entrepreneurial approach to social change that 
equates progressive social change and democratic participation with the expansion of 
the capitalist market economy. 
 
Discovering the market’s ‘invisible heart’?   
In 2014, the G8 Social Investment Taskforce published a report entitled The Invisible 
Heart of Markets, outlining a strategy for developing the global social investment 
market and implementing it in the respective G8 member states, invoking Adam 
Smith’s (1982) metaphor of the market’s ‘invisible hand’, the idea that in the pursuit 
of one’s self-interest social activity is steered via the market in beneficial ways for the 
collective good. The quip here is that the market not only has an invisible hand that 
steers it, it also has an invisible heart that beats for the good of society. This is a 
response to criticisms that arose in the wake of the financial crisis, namely that 
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markets – and in this context specifically unchecked financial markets – have created 
and exacerbated social ills and negative outcomes. Implicitly harking to the image of 
‘greedy’ or ‘selfish’ or ‘excessive’ individuals (especially bankers) conjured up in the 
context of the financial crisis, the message here is that financial markets do not have 
to be dysfunctional. Instead they can be made to work in the general interest, utilised 
for enhancing social good by trading with an explicitly social, environmental or even 
ethical purpose.   
 
The conceit of an ‘invisible heart of the market’ is the attempt to resolve the criticisms 
that had arisen in the wake of the global financial crisis as to the social shortcomings 
of financial liberalisation. In many countries, including in Britain, anti-austerity 
protests arose as an expression of this critique: a lack of democracy and accountability 
of elites, of the financial sector and of political institutions; and a blatant disregard for 
people and planet in favour of an overriding concern with profit (Ortiz et al., 2013). 4 
Not unlike the promotion of ‘globalisation with a human face’ in response to the 
antiglobalisation movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s,5 advocates of a 
purported ‘social turn’ for finance capital are suggesting that, rather than curbing the 
power of finance, the solution lies precisely in promoting it, because it is finance that 
can enable the creation of – not just economic –  but social value through focussing 
on the social impact that financial investments might have. As the report states (2014: 
1): 
 
The financial crash of 2008 highlighted the need for a renewed effort to ensure 
that finance helps build a healthy society. This requires a paradigm shift in capital 
market thinking from two-dimensions to three. By bringing a third dimension, impact, 
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to the 20th century capital market dimension of risk and return, impact investing has 
the potential to transform our ability to build a better society for all. 
 
Financial investors are not simply to be concerned with maximising their financial 
returns or managing their risk, they are to invest with a view to producing socially 
beneficial outcomes. Against indifference and the consequences of harm caused by 
financial trading, investors are to care where their money goes and what it creates in 
the world.  
 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the above would actually imply a paradigm shift away 
from the doctrine of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ (or heart), because it suggests that 
actors in the market place should not only pursue their own self-interest as Adam 
Smith suggested, but they should – as their guiding motivation – be concerned with 
the effects of their actions. There is clearly some confusion in the metaphor deployed 
here. In the remainder of this paper, this confusion will be unpacked in order to 
ascertain what is at stake in finance’s social turn. 
 
Using the state to remake society 
In his Hugo Young Lecture in 2009, Conservative prime minister David Cameron 
proposed his vision of a ‘Big Society’6 that would devolve political power to a local 
level, where municipalities and volunteer citizens could take control of local services 
and provide for their communities. This did not only involve a moral vision serving as 
a smokescreen for cuts as critics argued (cf. Williams, 2011), it also involved a 
finance model and a commitment to growing the social investment market in Britain. 
In a reminder that neoliberal globalisation has not diminished the role of the state in 
as much as it has transformed its political economy, David Cameron argued for the 
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need to ‘use to the state to remake society’ (Cameron, 2009) with Britain is at the 
helm of the social turn for finance.7  
 
While social or impact investing only really gained ground after 2009, as an idea it 
has its antecedents in the late 1980s (Schram, 2015). In Britain its beginnings date 
back to 2000 when the UK Government set up a ‘Social Investment Taskforce’ under 
New Labour (UK Social Investment Taskforce, 2000). This was chaired by venture 
capitalist Ronald Cohen who more recently led the ‘G8 Social Investment Taskforce’ 
as well as ‘Big Society Capital’,8 a social investment finance institution set up provide 
investment and enable the growth of this new sector, with £400 million of initial 
funds from dormant bank accounts and £200 million in equity investment from major 
high street banks (Edmonds, 2015). The City of London Corporation (2015) cites 
OECD research that identified 350 impact investment funds in existence globally in 
2012 with a total capital of $40bn. According to Big Society Capital (2016), social 
impact investing is worth at least £1,500 million. Aside from active support from the 
G8 countries, the EU also provides support and has formally recognised funds that 
invest 70% of investor capital into European social businesses as so-called ‘European 
Social Entrepreneurship Funds’ designed to enable more and better fundraising.9   
 
The relative importance of financial services for the British economy helps to explain 
why Britain is leading this particular innovation.10 The aim is for Britain to achieve a 
further competitive advantage in financial services by encouraging the use of social 
investment in the UK, promoting London as a leading global hub connecting social 
enterprise to capital markets (City of London Corporation, 2015). Moreover, as 
Linsey McGoey (2014) has argued, the role of the state is central in supporting market 
creation and the growth of the venture philanthropy sector. Consequently, it stands to 
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reason why successive governments in Britain have provided considerable assistance 
in establishing the necessary regulatory frameworks and introducing legislative 
changes that inscribe the logic of the social investment market into various levels of 
municipal and national policy-making.  
 
Initiatives have included the political promotion of volunteering and civic 
engagement under the ‘Big Society’ slogan and the establishment of a National 
Citizens Service for young people.11 Legislation includes the 2011 Localism Act, 
which grants greater powers to local councils and community groups to bid for and 
run welfare services. 12 Legislation also includes the 2012 Public Services (Social 
Value) Act that requires organisations bidding for government contracts to 
demonstrate not just the economic value, but also the social and environmental value 
they produce.13 Aside from releasing funds from dormant bank accounts, the UK 
Government has also implemented a series of tax incentives of up to 30% income tax 
relief for investors in order to attract investment to the sector.14 The City of London 
Corporation is collaborating with the Cabinet Office and Big Society Capital to set up 
a Social Investment Research Committee to improve regulatory and fiscal framework 
and improve transparency and reporting.15 This comes after alleged cases of misuse of 
funds in 2014 by the organisation Big Society Network, a company set up to promote 
and enable social investment projects (The Guardian, 2014; Third Sector, 2015). 
Other initiatives include the promotion of social enterprise procurement, developing a 
‘Buy Social Directory’, championing business volunteering within social enterprise 
and developing investment readiness funds for social sector organisations. The 
Cabinet Office has also set up a ‘Social Outcomes Fund’ consisting of £20 million 
providing ‘top-up’ funding for projects.16 
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Solving social problems: social impact bonds and the welfare state 
The social investment market involves a number of different repayable finance 
models for communities, enterprises and organisations developing projects with a 
social or environmental purpose. Examples include access to housing, employability 
skills, mental health services, eldercare, social care, healthcare, childcare or 
renewable energy projects. Social investment involves different kinds of funding 
models and investment capital for growth (secured debt, unsecured debt, community 
shares, blended risk capital and grant-loan-community contributions). It also involves 
bridging, matching or underwriting traditional asset ownership (purchasing them and 
transferring assets once they become viable), setting up platforms for community 
engagement or fundraising through grants as well as loans (cf. Swersky and Plunkett, 
2015). 
 
While there is a much bigger research agenda regarding the political economy of 
these new social finance models, this paper focuses specifically on the use of social 
investment in social policy through the uptake of an instrument called a social impact 
bond (SIB) at the level of the welfare state. SIBs are used to ‘solve social problems’ 
such as recidivism, foster care, social isolation of elderly people, drug addiction, or 
the prevalence of young people ‘not in education, employment or training’ (NEETs). 
Governments commission a consortia of third sector organisations who seek to 
address these social problems on the basis of a ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR) system. 
PbR means contracted third sector organisations commissioned to provide social or 
public services must evidence the achieved outcomes of their services before 
receiving payment. PbR has been criticised for favouring large providers and 
disadvantaging more ‘grassroots’ organisations who work successfully with their 
constituencies but cannot afford to pay for running costs in advance (Garton 
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Grimwood et al., 2015: 3). Advocates of SIBs (including the UK Government) 
suggest that the problem can be resolved with SIBs because funding can be provided 
by private finance who in effect lend the organisations the money they need (The 
Economist, 2016). 
 
Britain is home to the first SIBs to be implemented and the first few have already 
reached maturity (typically after three to five years).  The first ever SIB was used 
reduce recidivism at Peterborough Prison in 2010; another SIB was developed by the 
Private Equity Foundation to mentor disadvantaged young people at risk of 
‘becoming “NEETs”’.17According to UK Cabinet Office Centre for Social Impact 
Bonds, as of June 2016 there were 32 SIBs in use in Britain, with a steady growth of 
new ones being issued.18 There are currently three types of SIB: direct (delivery 
contract between outcomes payer and service provider), managed (delivery contract 
between outcomes payer and prime contractor) and intermediated (delivery contract 
between outcomes payer and investor-owned special purpose vehicle which contracts 
the service provider). Private investors investing in SIBS are to expect an annual rate 
of return between 15 and 30%, depending on achieved outcomes (cf. Whitfield, 2015: 
17).  The three government departments involved with commissioning SIB funded 
projects to date are the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).  
 
For example, a project aimed at supporting disadvantaged young people into 
education and employment sees the DWP “pay for one or more outcomes per 
participant which can be linked to improved employability.”19 The DWP will pay 
£700 for an “improved attitude toward school”, £1300 for “improved behaviour” and 
£1400 for “improved attendance”.  The DWP will also pay for the attainment of 
 11 
qualifications, paying more the better the qualification. Entering into as well as 
sustaining employment are also priced. The list of outcomes – from improved attitude 
towards school to the final outcome of sustained employment – are not incrementally 
but differentially priced. The highest educational certificate has the highest price 
attached to it, while improved attendance figures highest on the behavioural scale. 
Overall, educational achievement ranks higher than employment in the assumption 
that education provides more long-term rewards than the short-term goal of gaining 
immediate employment. It is noteworthy that entry into employment carries a higher 
payment than sustained employment. This may be a recognition of the high levels of 
precarity in the contemporary labour market at entry-level, or simply just an easier 
target to achieve. Attaching performance targets to pricing mechanisms is necessary 
for financialisation because it gives financial investors a framework within which to 
compare what investments would be likely to yield the most return. These 
interventions aim to use financial instruments, institutions and market mechanisms to 
produce certain subjects who think, feel, act and perform in ways that conform to 
ideas of productive citizenship and non-dependence on welfare, a point that will be 
returned to in a more detailed discussion later on in this paper.20 
 
The example above illustrates how the ability to quantify and measure social 
outcomes is key to linking social enterprise to capital markets, because investors must 
be able to ascertain the financial returns they can expect on their investments. As the 
G8 Social Investment Taskforce stipulates (2014: 35), the expansion of the social 
investment market “depends crucially on the development of reliable measures of 
social and environmental impact […], the more that impact measurement makes it 
possible to link accurately progress in achieving social outcomes to financial returns, 
the more compelling impact investment will become.” This builds on and extends 
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existing efforts by organisations to evidence their achievements and thereby justify 
their value to commissioners, funders or grant makers.  
 
In this context the terms ‘social value’, ‘social impact’, ‘added value’ or also ‘social 
return on investment’ have arisen.  These terms refer to the non-financial impacts of 
programmes: the ways in which interventions contribute to a better functioning of 
society or to environmental sustainability. Social impact can include outcomes like 
reducing homelessness or obtaining educational qualifications or employment, as 
illustrated in the example above. These are measures that are readily quantifiable 
because the outcomes can be counted – the amount of homeless people housed, the 
amount of qualifications achieved or the amount of individuals in employment. 
However, social impact can also include less tangible and more subjective factors that 
have an affective quality – feeling less lonely or isolated, feeling good, feeling 
worthy, having a voice, feeling sufficiently included in decision-making or feeling 
engaged in something meaningful (Wood and Leighton, 2010). There are a large 
number of accounting models to enable quantification and monetisation. The most 
widely adopted model is the SROI model,  a model of ‘Social Return in Investment’ 
first tabled by a venture philanthropy fund in the US in the 1990s (Ibid.). Its particular 
advantage is that it can quantify and ascribe monetary value to social value by 
calculating cost-efficiency and returns. 
 
Different to other types of bonds that pay a guaranteed interest, SIBs are 
performance-based. This means that if and only when certain outcomes are actually 
achieved, an investor receives a return. There are several models for setting prices and 
returns.21 The model most common to the way SIBs are being implemented by the 
UK Government has at its core a concern with achieving cost-savings. As the Cabinet 
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Office explains, “the starting point for most existing SIBs is to estimate the cost 
savings (or avoided future costs) that will accrue as a result of improvements in 
outcomes.”22 In the wake of the global financial crisis, the UK Government embarked 
on a path of public deficit reduction through the implementation of extensive austerity 
measures (Streeck, 2014).  While this ‘crisis of debt’ discourse has been criticised as 
justifying policies unable to deliver its promise of renewed economic growth (Hay, 
2013), it is nonetheless still the guiding doctrine of policy-making. Consequently, the 
UK Government remains concerned with fiscal consolidation. Therefore, finding 
alternative sources of funding for welfare and achieving short- as well as long-term 
cost-savings are a considerable priority.  
 
On the surface, SIBS seem to offer solutions to both of these policy priorities. First, 
SIBs enable governments to attract funding from the private sector to finance social 
policy initiatives. Moreover, there is an accounting advantage in the creation of this 
new asset class, because such funds no longer appear as government expenditure in 
national accounts.23 Second, the use of SIBs is supposed to enable innovation and 
cost-efficiency in service delivery, based on the argument common to privatisation 
initiatives, namely that market mechanisms and financial discipline inherently achieve 
such ends. However, it is unclear whether the proposed benefits of private finance 
actually do materialise. It is also unclear at whose expense cost-savings will be 
carried out. Both of these concerns will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Furthermore, the kind of welfare state model that underlies the imperative to save 
costs is one that constructs the very idea of a welfare state as a burden to society, 
revealing its particular ideological underpinnings in continuing the neoliberal project 
of dismantling public services and welfare provisioning while privatising social 
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responsibility. This may at first seem paradoxical in that much of the discourse of 
social investment is couched in terms of community empowerment and citizen 
engagement. These are sentiments that are often understood as pillars of collective 
social responsibility. However, the social responsibility invoked here is not a public 
one that commits to social provisioning through the public institutions of the state 
based on a set of generalised entitlements afforded to its citizens. Instead, it is private 
in both senses of the term: routed through business models and capitalist markets and 
based on the personal motivations and voluntary commitments of non-state actors 
(whether individual or collective). Moreover, it is not only the case that private 
finance is used to resource social services (albeit regressively).24 Of essence is the fact 
that such projects that will justify the further retrenchment of the welfare state and 
produce a certain kind of social subject: the overwhelming majority of projects that 
are being funded are about intervening in society to shape people’s behaviour or 
attitudes25 in order to reduce the very need for welfare entitlements or health and 
social services.  
 
This is why critics have pointed to SIBs as a continuation of neoliberal welfare 
reforms (Schram, 2015). Neoliberal welfare reform has been characterised by a 
combination of retrenchment in welfare spending, investment in human capital and 
‘workfare’ or labour market activation policies (Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011). This 
paper agrees that SIBs constitute a continuation of this neoliberal approach that tends 
towards a residualist welfare model and a narrow focus on labour market activation. 
However, the paper also argues that there is a specific quality to what is identified 
here as a financialisation of the welfare state. The difference lies in the shift from a 
social investment state (cf. Morel, 2012) to a social investment market. 
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Despite ongoing discussions about concessionary rates being afforded to projects by 
investors who wish to support projects with a social purpose for ethical reasons 
(Foley, 2015), the logic of the undertaking dictates that only what is profitable will be 
funded, which raises questions for the quality and nature of the services delivered. 
Moreover, it is clearly stated that social investment markets will operate in the same 
way, that is with the same kinds of risk and return characteristics as any other kind of 
financial market, with potential investors including governments; trusts and 
foundations; individual retail investors; wealthy individuals; and mainstream banks.26 
As has been pointed out, the use of private finance to meet public policy goals means 
that these goals become subordinate to the demands of financial yield and to global 
financial markets (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014; Mitropoulous and Bryan, 2015). This 
paper extends this insight to argue that the financialisation the welfare state is 
currently undergoing at present is marked by a co-imbrication of the state and the 
financial sector. While the state utilises private finance to intervene in society in ways 
that ostensibly seek to reduce welfare costs and welfare dependency, the state is 
utilised as a vehicle for financial capital accumulation. 
 
Reducing the cost of societal externalities 
The key here is that investments are to achieve an identifiable social impact by 
solving social problems, which are in turn constructed as costs to society. In other 
words, social problems are defined as anything that constitutes a cost to the welfare 
state (and thus to the tax payer): e.g. ‘at-risk’ children being cared for outside of the 
home, welfare dependency and insufficient economic productivity of the unemployed, 
the burden on health services of rising levels of mental illness, the health costs of 
social isolation in the elderly or the cost of crime and the criminal justice system.  
Cost-savings can be concrete savings such as a reduction in expenditure due to 
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improved cost-effectiveness of an existing service, or they can be projected savings 
that are made because an intervention successfully resolves an issue that would have 
otherwise been a lingering problem for governments and tax payers, such as 
environmental degradation, unemployment, crime or the costs of welfare provision. A 
high number of SIB-based interventions are aimed at targeting people with poor life 
chances that are considered a high cost to society as recipients of benefits or other 
forms welfare and because they are not sufficiently economically productive.  
 
Savings can be one of three different types. First, they can be a reduction in the 
historical costs of delivering outcomes, i.e. providing a service more cheaply. Second, 
there can be future cost reductions, i.e. reducing the cost unemployment, ill-health or 
old age. For example, reducing the amount of people using hospital beds or the 
amount of days a child spends in care services, or reducing the rate of re-offending. A 
third area of cost-saving is more abstract, namely the projected cost-savings achieved 
by avoiding future expenditures. For example, this could be reducing the cost of so-
called ‘poorly adapted individuals’ to society through interventions aimed at 
transforming such ‘poorly adapted’ individuals into ‘well-adapted’ individuals who 
commit fewer crimes or become less reliant on social services or benefit payments, or 
who find employment and therefore an income with which to sustain their livelihood. 
In these cases, counterfactuals need to be used to determine the projected future 
savings or avoided future costs: proxies have to be invented that can quantify what 
costs would have been incurred if the intervention had not been undertaken.  
 
Given that long-term future savings or costs avoided can also constitute aspects of the 
metrics for returns to investors, a thorny question arises. To what extent can these 
really be said to be real savings. Are they not actually speculative ones? The attempt 
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to valorise speculative futures is a key feature of financialisation. Or, as Randy Martin 
(2002: 105) put it, “forecasts and predictions do not need to be right, they need to be 
quantifiable.” A closer look at the ways in which returns to investors are being 
calculated on the basis of projected future savings or the use of counterfactuals (what 
might have happened without the intervention27) would suggest that this may well be 
a feature of the ways that SIBs are used. And yet: while some of the ways that 
potential savings are to be calculated may end up being speculative, the monetary 
payments that are made to investors as a result are very real.  
 
Cost-saving: limits, inconsistencies and critiques 
In addition, is not clear whether these cost-savings will actually be achieved.  Recent 
research has argued that setting up the infrastructure for social finance is in itself a 
costly endeavour. Moreover, there are significant questions of scalability that would 
enable cost-savings to actually materialise (Joy and Shields, 2013; Whitfield, 2015). 
Furthermore, while advocates hail the combined effects of innovation and cost-
efficiency enabled by the market, critics have been concerned about the negative 
effects of a market logic that seeks to obtain maximum outcomes at the lowest cost. 
Historically, the cost of market-based provisioning has actually been as high or even 
higher and where cheaper service provision occurs, this has usually meant lower pay 
and unstable working conditions for staff (Loxley, 2013). 
 
Consequently, we can ask who it is who actually bears the cost of cost-saving where 
cost-savings are made by cutting wages and changing working conditions? Dowling 
and Harvie (2014) have argued that the metric of social value relies on a recoding of 
labour inputs (that would require remuneration) to social value outputs (that do not 
require remuneration). The authors use the example of artists providing 
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unremunerated art therapy in eldercare homes as a form of community engagement; 
other examples might include young people volunteering in nursery schools under the 
proviso of a ‘win-win’ for all in which the nursery school children benefit from the 
presence of the young adults who in turn benefit from the experience of being with 
children, or pensioners mentoring young people as a way of passing on their life 
experience and knowledge to young people and as a way of combatting loneliness and 
isolation in old age. The labeling of community and volunteering activities as social 
value outcomes or as added value in service delivery contributes both to 
deprofessionalisation (that legitimises lower wages) and the invisibilisation of work 
(which justifies non-remuneration). Hence, even where social or impact investing is 
understood to be producing an actual social good as opposed to merely reducing 
costs, the profits that are made are potentially sourced from the exploitation of unpaid 
labour. This development concurs with a broader trend of utilising volunteer labour in 
the third sector (Dean, 2015). 
 
The pressure to achieve targets risks resulting in the misrepresentation of results 
(Silver and Clarke, 2013; Whitfield, 2015) as happened in the case of the 
Peterborough Prison SIB, the first project to be undertaken in the UK. Robert 
Ogman’s research (2016: 59) has shown that in actual fact, no cost-savings were 
made:  
 
While the intervention successfully reduced reoffending, it failed to reduce 
public expenditures. As a result, the state was not able to create savings to share with 
investors. Instead, it was compelled to increase expenditure in spite of its supposed 
fiscal problems, forming special ‘outcome funds’ to pay investor returns. 
 19 
Furthermore, these contradictions did not prevent the government from hailing it as a 
success or using it to justify the further expansion of SIB projects across the country. 
 
It is socially, ethically or politically debatable whether welfare can really be 
delineated in such narrow cost-saving terms, especially when it reinforces the 
normative claim that the welfare state exists merely as a residual welfare state whose 
sole aim is to reduce welfare dependency and foster the self-sufficiency of 
individuals.   
 
 
Privately financed, but publicly funded: accumulation by dispossession 
Critical IPE literature has provided an analysis of the consequences of the global 
economic crisis of 2008 for the UK. In the face of fiscal consolidation following bank 
bail-outs (Blyth, 2011; Streeck, 2014), the restructuring of the British economy has 
been shown to involve further public sector retrenchment, a reduction in welfare 
provision and a permanent austerity agenda that is linked to lowering public debt and 
engaging in market-led growth (Kerr et al., 2011; Taylor-Gooby, 2012). This 
restructuring is geared towards resolving capital’s crisis of profitability through the 
creation of new commodities and markets in a recovery model led by private finance. 
However, as Green and Lavery (2015) argue, the recovery that Britain has witnessed 
has been regressive in its distributional dimensions. The authors argue that the 
promotion of a business-led recovery has been marked by “rising asset wealth for the 
few and falling living standards and economic insecurity for wage earners” 
(Ibid.:893) premised on quantitative easing and asset price inflation coupled with 
labour market restructuring and the increase of low-paid and precarious employment, 
emblematic of which is the dramatic increase in zero-hour contracts. 
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The growth of the social investment market in Britain since 2008 constitutes yet 
another piece in the puzzle of ‘regressive redistribution’ that Green and Lavery 
identify. First, in terms of the potential longer term effects of a cost-saving agenda on 
working conditions and pay in the sector as discussed above. Second, there is a 
regressive redistribution of wealth occurring because the UK Government is 
borrowing money from private investors, which it then pays back with interest as 
explained above. The use of SIBs in social policy facilitates the transfer of wealth 
from the public purse to private investors. As discussed above, it is the cost-savings 
that are made that constitute the return on investment that is paid to investors. Even if 
this cost-saving approach made sense and even if cost-savings were to be made, the 
way that SIBs operate means that any savings that are made do not actually remain in 
the public purse and are not put to use in other ways that would promote public 
interests. Instead, they are paid to private investors as a form of interest on the loans 
they are providing. This is a form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004) 
whereby public funds are being privatised through the use of financial instruments 
such as SIBs, amounting to their ‘quiet confiscation’ (cf. Marx, 1976: 882). 
Consequently, it is evident that these social interventions may well be privately 
financed, but they are still publicly funded. While the justification for this is that 
private investors must be incentivised and in turn rewarded for providing these 
allegedly much-needed resources, in actual fact, public funds are transferred to private 
investors as a source of profit. 
 
Marx describes primitive accumulation as the original process that made industrial 
capitalism possible, primarily through the expulsion of agricultural workers from the 
commons and the enclosure of this land, as well as the exploitation of resources in the 
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colonies. Analytically, the concept refers to the ways in which capital amasses wealth 
through outside of the formal wage relation or market exchange. This happens either 
through confiscation, fraud, brute force or more formally through the apparatus of the 
state that provides a legal framework for the conversion of various property rights into 
exclusive property rights, along with the ideological legitimation for doing so. 
‘Accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004)28 is a term that seek to explain and 
evidence the continued relevance and necessity of processes of primitive 
accumulation for capitalist development today to which recourse is sought when 
capitalism is in crisis as a way of overcoming limits and finding new sources of 
profitability (cf. De Angelis, 2001; Bonefeld, 2011). Contemporary examples include 
the privatisation of public assets, increasing indebtedness, the (gendered) off-loading 
of the cost of social reproduction onto individuals and households (Pearson and Elson, 
2015), land grabs on the African continent and in Latin America (Backhouse, 2015) 
or the expansion of individual and household debt (Montgomerie and Buedenbender, 
2015).  
 
One of the reasons for the concerted interest in growing the global social investment 
market is undoubtedly to find new avenues for capital accumulation and with that, 
routes to economic recovery in the face of crisis. However, the analysis of SIB-based 
interventions provided in this paper not only concurs with the argument that economic 
recovery is regressive as Green and Lavery have argued, it also suggests that the paths 
sought to economic recovery are not necessarily based on ‘real’ growth, i.e. expanded 
reproduction (Harvey, 2004). Instead, they are reliant on forms of dispossession.  
 
Producing financialised subjects: democracy and the entrepreneurial approach 
to social change 
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The initiatives that are to be funded by social impact bonds are orientated towards 
producing self-responsibilised, financially literate and economically productive 
subjects in line with the kinds of neoliberal welfare reforms discussed above. 
Furthermore, the targeting of individuals in need of remedial intervention reinforces 
the idea that the remedy for a social problem is to be found at the level of its 
symptom. In other words, by changing the individual affected as opposed to 
transforming the social, political and economic structures that create such social 
problems in the first place (Silver and Clarke, 2013). The interventions that are being 
developed also involve financial literacy and financial inclusion in attempts to 
actively produce ‘investment-ready’ financial subjects – ready, one could argue, to be 
‘invested in’ – but also ready to participate as debtors and creditors in a financialised 
economy.29 
 
Investors need to ensure their investments are successful and that projects run 
accordingly. For example, giving investors the right to replace service providers if 
they fear the outcomes will not be achieved30 affords a level of power and decision-
making to investors that shapes social policy according to their interests in ensuring a 
financial yield. This effectively constitutes a process of de-democratisation that turns 
private financial investors in particular and financial markets more generally into 
public policy-makers. This is underscored by recent research that has demonstrated 
that contrary to the stated aims, the involvement of service users in the design, 
operation and assessment of projects so far has been very limited (Whitfield, 2015; 
Burmester and Wohlfahrt, 2015).  
 
In effect this amounts to yet another kind of ‘privatisation’ underpinned by the 
growing acceptance of what this paper suggests is best understood as an 
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entrepreneurial theory of social change. An entrepreneurial theory of social change 
puts centre-stage private individuals as agents of social change. These private 
individuals are often high-net worth individuals who shape public agendas based on 
their views of how society should be organised, using their private wealth to do so.  
This fuses the figure of the philanthropist with the figure of the entrepreneur, finding 
a new expression in concerns for social justice framed as social enterprise as opposed 
to the more traditional conception of charity. This may seem progressive, but there are 
political implications for democracy and the governance of public interests. This is 
not only the case with regard to wealthy individuals and the undue power they wield 
to shape public interests. The proliferation of new business models for community 
and social enterprise that we are currently witnessing, along with the new financial 
innovations that seek to involve ordinary people more and more in financial activities, 
constitute a second aspect of this de-democratisation. Examples include the 
crowdsourcing of SIBs (Cohen, 2015), the promotion of investment through 
initiatives like ‘Social Saturdays’ (Jones, 2014) that encourage ordinary people to 
invest their money into social enterprises; the establishment of social pensions to 
attract investment from pension funds. De-democratisation occurs where democratic 
participation becomes synonymous with asset acquisition. Moreover, the new kinds of 
community business models that are currently being rolled out mean that local 
municipal services become increasingly subsumed under the logic of the market and 
the requirement to function as a business and/or repay investors.31 
 
Risk management and securitisation 
The UK Government states that the advantage of using social impact bonds to fund 
social interventions is that it conveniently shifts risk from the public to the private.32 
This is because investors are only repaid and receive a return on their investment if an 
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intervention achieves its stipulated outcomes. If it does not, then the investors not 
only lose the money they put in, they also do not receive a return. As advocates 
clearly state, social investment is about ‘financing the unbankable’ (Social Investment 
Research Council, 2015), i.e. it is about bringing into the realms of finance those 
organisations and initiatives that would normally not receive private finance because 
they would be considered too risky. Consequently, there will be mechanisms put in 
place to mitigate exposure to risk, whether by intervening directly to avert 
unsuccessful outcomes or by developing financial derivatives with which to securitise 
risk.  
Financialisation involves the management of risk through securitisation using 
derivatives that are traded in financial markets. The more financialisation expands and 
encompasses aspects of social life, the more “ordinary people are being decomposed 
into a range of risks and assets as bundles of exposure” (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014: 
899). What is traded is not the asset itself but the exposure to the risk of the 
performance of that asset, where uncertainty of future performances is converted into 
knowable risk and thus also made tradable. Current risk management strategies in the 
social investment market include that capital provision over the life of the SIB is not 
guaranteed, the draw-down is staggered to mitigate underperformance, there is a 
phased service delivery over discrete cohorts, investors can replace service providers, 
and contracts with providers only last one year (Social Finance, 2015). Not least, as 
has happened in 2015 with Goldman Sachs (who consider themselves a pioneer in 
social impact bonds), investors can also pull out of projects in the face of uncertainty 
about repayments and returns. 33  Although SIBs are currently not tradable (cf. 
Schram, 2015), the UK Government has explicitly stated it wishes to see a secondary 
market develop (cf. Disley et al., 2011). As Edmonds (2015: 11) explains, Big Society 
Capital/Big Society Bank aims to “create effective financial markets to trade and 
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issue securities”. This is a sentiment echoed too by the financial sector. Already in 
2011, this was discussed: 
 
The cash flow of a SIB could be securitised. This would be easy to do in its 
current form as it is British Government cash flow. That would create an instrument 
that would trade as a function of the achievement of that individual social target. One 
could possibly see a number of these instruments traded on a Social Stock 
Exchange.34 This would then de facto create a secondary market providing liquidity 
and exit to investors.35 
 
Goldman Sachs had insured its investment in the Rikers Island recidivism project 
with Bloomberg Philanthropists to the sum of US$ 6 million (Gonen, 2015). 
Moreover, a report by JP Morgan and the Global Impact Investing Network confirms 
that the lack of risk management strategies for investors is one of the main 
impediments to the growth of the market. Some of the problems it mentions that relate 
to risk are the  “lack of appropriate capital access [to] the risk return spectrum, […] 
difficult exiting investments [and] a lack of innovative deal/fund structures to 
accommodate investors or portfolio companies’ needs” (JP Morgan, 2015: 8). The 
City of London Corporation (2015) also stresses the need for more ‘complex financial 
instruments to shift risk reward requirements’ and recommends the need for guarantee 
structures and peer-to-peer lending. Consequently, it cannot be precluded that 
secondary markets will not develop in the near future for the purposes of 
securitisation, thus exposing this field of social policy –  and with that the (often 
vulnerable) people and projects funded by SIB initiatives – to the vicissitudes of 
global financial markets. 
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Critique and legitimation 
As with any new initiative, there are different constituencies that need to be 
convinced of the efficacy of social and impact investing. Individual investors may still 
be cautious of putting their money into these new ventures (Lethbridge, 2015), yet for 
capital overall, this is potentially a significant area of profitability. While there has 
been some critical journalism (Toynbee, 2011; Cohen, 2014; Maisano, 2014), the 
proliferation of reports by governments, multilateral institutions, think tanks, 
foundations and non-governmental organisations set up to promote impact investing 
demonstrates considerable efforts to produce consent to impact investing. McHugh et 
al. (2014) have discussed how the third sectors in the UK and the USA are divided in 
their acceptance of this social turn for finance, although resistance is diminishing as 
the premises and tenets of neoliberalism become more accepted among a younger 
generation. Among social investment supporters there have also been concerns that 
the original aims and ethos of social investment is being undermined by the new 
move to connect social investment to large financial players with social investment 
becoming an asset class modelled on the venture capital market (Alternative 
Commission on Social Investment, 2015). For public service unions there is the 
concern about the effects on their members in terms of the working conditions of 
public sector workers and the effects on public procurement regulations (cf. 
Lethbridge, 2015; Whitfield, 2015; Unison, 2016: 14).  
 
Furthermore, there are divergent discourses in different country contexts as evidenced 
in the country reports of the G8 Social Investment Taskforce. In the UK where 
austerity is a dominant policy orientation, there is a focus on the role of the social 
investment market in plugging the public funding gap. On the other hand, in 
Germany, a country with a less ostensive austerity agenda, there is also less emphasis 
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on social investment as an answer to austerity, instead pointing to the projected 
increase of welfare costs, even without cuts, due to factors such as population 
ageing.36 This divergence in legitimation suggests that the support for social or impact 
investing can be inserted into different legitimation discourses depending on the 




This paper has sought to provide a critique of the financialisation of the welfare state 
and the introduction of social impact bonds (SIBs) as a social turn for finance. This 
social turn arises in part in response to the global financial crisis and the criticisms 
levelled against the deregulation of the financial sector, as well as the requirement to 
find new drivers of economic growth. With reference to the first report of the G8 
Social Investment Taskforce set up under the UK’s most recent G8 presidency, the 
paper discussed how the notion of an explicitly ‘social’ orientation for finance 
constitutes an internalisation of these criticisms in ways that legitimate the further 
expansion of financial markets. The paper has analysed how SIBs have been taken up 
by the British government and used to support continued neoliberal welfare reform 
premised upon an austerity agenda, where SIB-funded projects are designed to deliver 
cost-savings for society without addressing the structural conditions of social and 
economic inequality that produce the social problems it seeks to remedy in the first 
place. Not only does this imply that welfare and public services are nothing more than 
a burden to the tax payer, it also constitues a form of privatisation in which the state is 
used to accumulate financial profits from public funds. Moreover, the paper raises 
concerns about surbordinating social policy objectives to global financial markets and 
the consequences this will have for projects that are funded in this way. 
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While advocates of social investment may argue that accessing private finance makes 
available much-need resources and funding to provide social services, the 
development of this financial architecture for social investment and the attempt to 
connect the social interventions of the welfare state to global capital markets amounts 
to much more than a simple provision of funding. This is because the purpose of 
financial investment is to yield financial return on the investments made. Advocates 
of a social turn for finance wish to suggest that extending the concerns of finance 
from simple risk-return metrics to include a concern with impact marks a progressive 
turn. Yet, as this paper has shown, there is a regressive logic at play here that is 
merely obfuscated by the discourse of social impact.  
 
Even within the financial sector, there have been criticisms of the cost-saving 
approach to social investment and the dangers of an economic logic overriding that of 
social outcomes have been pointed to (Brown, 2013). Similarly, underlying the whole 
discourse of a social return on investment lies an intention to find ways to make 
visible and account the non-economic dimensions of social outcomes. However, the 
problem is that in the last instance, for social investment to work for investors, there 
needs to be a financial profit. Without a profit, the overwhelming majority of 
investors will simply not invest their money. The attempts to harmonise the profit 
motivation of financial investors with a social purpose leads to the subordination of 
the latter under the former and not the other way around. Financialisation is not a 
simple process of allocating resources to one place or another, it imposes a set of 
disciplinary measures that shape the social processes they affect, in turn privatising 
gains and socialising risks and costs. Overall, the paper points to the co-imbrication 
between the state and the financial sector in which the state is using finance to 
 29 
intervene in society in ways that ostensibly seek to reduce costs and welfare 
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